We ask how to share the cost of nitely many public goods (items) among users with di erent needs: some smaller subsets of items are enough to serve the needs of each user, yet the cost of all items must be covered, even if this entails ine ciently paying for redundant items. Typical examples are network connectivity problems when an existing (possibly ine cient) network must be maintained.
Introduction
Consider a group of agents with di erent needs who must share the cost of several indivisible public goods (items). The needs of a user are met by certain combinations (subsets) of these goods, and the pattern of these subsets is arbitrary. This very general problem encompasses a variety of familiar fair division problems, including partners sharing a library of software licenses; cities sharing a set of antennas, routers, or other broadcasting devices geographically dispersed, so that each device reaches only a subset of cities; users of a network requiring certain connectivity between certain nodes of the graph, as in the minimal cost spanning tree problem, its variants where some agents require higher order connectivity, the traveling salesman problem, and more. 1 What makes the problem di cult is that the substitutability of the di erent items can di er greatly across agents: out of three PC-software and three Macsoftware, one partner may need all three PC licenses, while another may be happy with any combination of two licenses, one of each type; or one network user may be served by any path connecting "his" node to the source, while another cannot use certain edges; and so on.
In contrast to essentially all the axiomatic cost sharing literature, we do not allow the agents to provide a cheapest (e cient) subset of items serving all individual needs. This is relevant to the construction of the network, or of the broadcasting devices, but it fails to address the equally important issue of sharing the cost of a given network. In our model the set of items is exogeneously xed; it is enough to cover all needs, and typically include redundant items, i.e., items that can be discarded without any service interruption, but that our agents must nevertheless pay for. This assumption is realistic when the items represent long-lived pieces of infrastructure, such as antennas, edges of a physical utility network, or even licenses with multi-years subscription commitments: redesigning the set of items is not an option, and each item has usage and maintenance costs that must be covered (even closing or neutralizing an item can be costly). Therefore the familiar idea of assigning costs by focusing on the Stand Alone (e cient) cost of the various coalitions of agents plays almost no role in our analysis. 2 An instance of our general model involves a xed, nite, set R of desirable "items", a speci c cost for each item, and a set N of users who must share the total cost of R. User i has a set D i of "service constraints" S i : providing all items in S i meets i's needs. For instance in connectivity games, the items are edges of the network, and if a user needs to connect two speci c nodes, D i is the set of paths between these two nodes.
We propose and axiomatize a division of the total cost of all items based on an usage index for each item and each agent, capturing the importance of this item to this agent purely in terms of service options, independently of the cost of the item. Then we divide the cost of each item in proportion to the pro le of usage indices: this ensures that individual shares are additive with respect to the pro le of costs. Additivity with respect to costs is a familiar restriction on cost allocation rules, going back to Shapley's original axiomatization (Shapley, 1953) , and maintained throughout most of the axiomatic cost sharing literature, see e.g., Moulin (2002) . We adopt it for the usual reasons of computational simplicity and cost decentralization.
In the elementary case where items have no substitutability for any agent (each agent i is served if and only if a certain set S i of items is provided:
, agent i's usage index will be 1 for each item a in S i , and 0 for the items outside S i . Here, our solutions divide the cost of each item equally between those agents who need it, or equally among all agents if this item is useless (is outside [ i S i ). An example of this situation is the classic "airport game" (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977) , where this division coincides with the Shapley value of the corresponding Stand Alone cooperative game.
But the standard tools of cooperative game theory are not helpful for the interesting instances of our problem where the items are partally substitutable. Consider two agents, Ann and Bob, and two items a; b, such that Ann is served by either one of a and b, while Bob needs both a and b. Unlike Bob, Ann does not need a given item as she will be served by the other; accordingly she should pay less for each item because she is more exible than Bob. The Stand Alone core requires Ann to pay at most the cost of the cheapest item. Combining this constraint with cost additivity forces Ann to pay nothing at all, as recommended in Moulin and Laigret (2011): Ann's free ride is clearly unfair to Bob since Ann still has access to be served. The Shapley value of the Stand Alone game is not additive in costs; it charges Ann one half of the cheapest item, say a to x ideas. Thus she is held as responsible as Bob for a, and not at all for b, just because a happens to be cheaper than b, maybe by a very small amount. We submit that this is too hard on Ann with respect to a (which she does not need as much as Bob), and too easy on her w.r.t. b (which would be helpful to her if a was unavailable).
Our counting index yields a more nuanced division of costs. For both items it assigns to Bob the maximal usage index 1, and a smaller yet non zero index to Ann. It is computed from the con guration of (inclusion) minimal serving sets for each agent: the usage index of an agent for a given item is the ratio of the number of his minimal serving sets containing the item, over the number of all his minimal serving sets. Here Ann has two minimal serving sets, fag; fbg, so her usage index is 1=2 for both. Bob has only one minimal serving set fa; bg, so his usage index is 1 for both. Hence both costs are divided in proportions 1=3 to Ann and 2=3 to Bob, which we nd more palatable in this example.
Our main result in section 5, axiomatizes a one-dimensional family of usage indices, including the counting index just discussed, and the egalitarian index of 1 for all items in the union of minimal serving sets, [ D i S i , and 0 outside this set. The central property in this result is the axiom \Irrelevance of Additional Needs" (IAN), stating that if a new item appears, which creates no new minimal service options for any agent, then the usage index (and thereby the cost allocation) of the original set of items remains unchanged. The IAN property is quite natural, and it has much bite. It allows for instance to "merge" two items that always appear together in the minimal serving sets of all agents: the single merged item inherits the common usage index of the two previous items.
Relation to the literature
The model was introduced by Moulin and Laigret (2011) , who discuss the case where each item is indispensable to some agent: if we fail to provide any single item, someone is not served; they propose the equal-need solution, dividing the cost of any item equally between all agents who need this item for service. We saw in the above example with two items a; b, that this solution, charging everything to Bob, is too simplistic for our purpose. Moreover it relies on the Stand Alone core property, which may not be feasible in our model where items are typically redundant (not indispensable for any agent).
The set of serving sets of a given agent is a simple game where the items are the "players" (see e.g., Peleg and S• udholter, 2003) . Hence power indices (see e.g., Holler and Owen, 2001 ) of simple games could replace the usage indices we develop below in the proportional sharing of each item (see (2) below). Yet indices such as the Shapley value summing to 1 over all items, are not suited for our problem: by symmetry, in the above example with two items a; b, both Ann and Bob give the same index 1 2 to each item, hence each cost is split equally, which ignores the fact that Ann is more exible in her needs than Bob. Moreover, the Shapley value (and Banzhaf value for that matter) clearly violates the IAN property mentioned above.
Contents
We de ne the cost sharing problem in section 2, and usage indices in section 3; we introduce a handful of axiomatic properties in section 4, and state and prove our main characterization Theorem in section 5. Section 6 illustrates our canonical counting method in a variety of examples, in particular in network connectivity problems. Some concluding comments are provided in section 7.
The model
We x the in nite sets N and R of potential agents and potential items (resources), respectively. The description of a problem entails, rst, a nite set of agents N , N N , and a nite set of items R, R R. Next, the cost vector c 2 R R + speci es the cost c a of each item a 2 R. The items are public goods, consumed without rivalry by all agents in N , who must share the total cost c R = P a2R c a . Finally, the needs of agent i 2 N are described by a non empty set D De nition 1. A cost allocation rule is a mapping with domain such that (N; R; fS i g i2N ; c) 2 R N + for any problem in N;R , and moreover
Usage indices
The cost allocation rule is additive if, for any two problems that di er at most in their cost function, we have
This amounts to write the rule as
where the vector '(N; R; fD i g i2N ; a) 2 (N ) (the N -simplex) assigns relative shares in the division of c a . We call its coordinate ' j (N; R; fD i g i2N ; a) the usage index of resource a by agent j, given the pro le fD i g i2N of service constraints. Usage indices capture the relative importance of a given item for a given agent, relative to the full pro le of service constraints. This interpretation suggests some natural restrictions on ', when the need of a given agent for a given item is maximal, non zero, or null.
The need of agent i for item a is maximal when a 2 S for all S 2 D i , in which case we say that item a is indispensable to i. Let G i be the set of items indispensable to i. Fixing the service needs of agents other than i, we require that i's share of a's cost be largest when a 2 G i . We say that for agent i 2 N the item a 2 R is critical at S 2 D i if S na = 2 D i . By our assumption that D i is made of non empty subsets of R, the set of critical items for agent i, H i = fa 2 R j a is critical for some S 2 D i g, is non empty (while in most of our examples, G i is empty for most i). An item critical for i is of some use to this agent, so it is fair to hold i responsible for some of its cost. On the contrary, if item a is not critical for i, then providing a has no impact on whether i is served or not, so we do not charge him for a's cost. Finally, we require that the agents are equally responsible for a completely useless item.
De nition 2. A usage index associates to any N 2 N , R 2 R, and any pro le of service constraints fD i g i2N ; a), a vector of shares '(N; R; fD i g i2N ; a) 2 (N ). The mapping ' satis es the following four assumptions:
i) if a is indispensable to i at e D i , then i's cost share is largest:
(where for simplicity we omit N; R in the argument of ') ii) if a is critical to i at D i , then i pays something of its cost:
but is critical to some other agent(s), then i is not charged for a:
iv) if a is not critical for any agent, its cost is divided equally:
In the next section we introduce axiomatic properties powerful enough to characterize a one-dimensional family of usage indices. Indices in this family take the simple \proportional" form,
where (D i ; a) is agent i's individual usage index for item a at D i . This de nes a usage index in the sense of De nition 2 if
and we adopt the convention
The simplest example of an individual usage index meeting (3) and (4), only checks whether an item is critical or not:
This egalitarian index is very crude, ignoring much of the information conveyed by the serving sets. This is clear already for the two items example in the introduction: the corresponding rule splits all costs equally, whether with two or three items. Yet in large interconnected networks such as the Internet, we often see users paying at fees, and service providers operating under peering agreements, despite substantial di erences in size and required capacity: this suggests that 0 is not unrealistic. Note that property ii) in De nition 2 rules out the simple index 3 which only charges the cost of item a to agents for whom a is indispensable:
See however the rst concluding comment (section 7) addressing the relaxation of property ii).
Our next index focuses on the pattern of minimal serving sets for each agent i, i.e., on those serving sets for which all items are critical. Write
g for the (non empty) set of minimal serving sets, and
Sg for the subset of those containing item a. Note that
We de ne the canonical counting index as follows,
It clearly meets the properties (3) and (4). This index measures the centrality of a given item for the agent's service options. In connection networks this corresponds to the relative marginal connectivity of a given edge. Thus 1 is reminiscent of the index of \betweenness centrality" describing, in the networks literature, the in uence of given edges and nodes in a graph (see e.g., Jackson 2008).
Our last example is a probabilistic usage index. Given D i and an ordering : N ! [n] of N , let F i ( ) be the set of minimal serving sets appearing rst in this ordering,
Moreover, let e S i ( ) 2 F i ( ) be the set that lexicographically minimize the rst coordinate in S i given the order , and let
That is, p (D i ; a) is de ned as the probability that a 2 F i , for a uniform random ordering of the items. In other words, it measures the \likelihood of usage" of an item a, in a hypothetical world where we only need to provide a minimal serving set. Clearly (3) and (4) hold true.
In the two-item example of the introduction, the indices p and 1 coincide (1 for Bob and 1 2 for Ann, for each item). Add now a third item d, and assume that Ann's minimal serving sets are fag; fbg; fdg, while Bob's are fa; bg; fdg. Then we have
The probabilistic index is by design heavier on small minimal serving sets than on large ones, a normative choice which has merit but is not warranted by the primitives of the model: why should an agent be more responsible for items in small rather than large (minimal) serving sets? Example 2 in section 6.3 reinforces this point. The index p is similarly sensitive to the merging of \twin" items, as we explain in the discussion of the IAN axiom below.
Axioms for usage indices
Our rst two requirements are standard. A usage index should be oblivious to the name of agents: Anonymity, and to the labeling of items: Neutrality.
Anonymity (ANO): if be a permutation of agents in N , then
The next three properties are the heart of our proposal.
Consistency (CSY): for any N 2 N ; R 2 R, i 2 N , and a 2 R, we have:
Consistency is arguably one of the most popular requirements of allocation rules in the entire literature on fair division of resources and costs (surveyed in Thomson, 1998 ). In our model it states that upon removing an agent and reducing costs accordingly, the relative cost shares of the the remaining agents should be the same in the reduced and in the original problem.
Any usage index taking the simple proportional form (2), for some individual index (D i ; a), is clearly anonymous and consistent; it is also neutral if is. In the next axiom we x N 2 N ; R 2 R and two problems (N; R; fD j g j2N ) and (N;
Irrelevance of Additional Needs (IAN): if for all i 2 N the service needs D i and D 0 i are such that:
then '(R; fD i g i2N ; a) = '(R [ fbg; fD 0i g i2N ; a) for all a 2 R.
Statements (8) and (9) 
Our nal axiom applies to K isomorphic problems (N; R k ; fD j k g j2N ): that is, the sets R k are pairwise disjoint and of the same size, and there is a bijection
k 0 , and such that k 0 k" kk 0 = kk" for all k; k 0 ; k":
An agent is served in the K-replicated problem if and only if it is served in any one of the component problems. Think of the classical "airport game" where we must share the cost of several identical runways, while each airline's needs are covered by a single runway. Replication says that the cost of each runway will be split exactly as if the duplicate runways were absent.
Our three usage indices, egalitarian, counting, and probabilistic, all meet Replication.
Characterization result(s)
and write ' for the corresponding proportional usage index (2). (7) is the null vector and ' i (N; R; fD j g j2N ; a) = 1. Finally if a 2 R [ j2N H j , equation (7) is the identity
: Finally if we replicate the problem (N; R 1 ; fD j g j2N ) to (N; e R; f e D j g j2N ) as in the premises of REP, we get j e D j j = K jD j j and j e D j (a)j = jD j (a)j for all j, so that the ratio in (5) does not change.
We x an usage index ' meeting all our axioms, and show the converse statement in three steps.
Step 2: De nition 2, Anonymity, and CSY, imply that ' takes the proportional form (2), for an individual usage index (R; D i ; a) meeting properties (3) and (4) .
We x throughout this step R, and an item a. (7) applied twice with N = f1; 2; 3g and i = 1; 2 gives,
(not symmetric in the two variables), and combining the above equality with two similar ones where the roles of the agents are permuted, we have, for all
) for some positive functions f; g. We can take
Repeated applications of CSY give
for all n and all pro les in Z. Therefore ' takes the proportional form (2) whenever all D j are in Z. We set (D) = 0 if D = 2 Z, and it is now clear that the index ' de ned by (2) , and the convention Step 3: Irrelevance of Additional Needs implies the form
where g(p; q) is de ned for all integers p; q such that 0 q p 1, g(p; q) > 0 if q 1 and g(p; q) = 0 if q = 0. The canonical mapping from an arbitrary service constraint D to its inclusion minimal subsets D is a bijection between the set of service constraints, and that of minimal service constraints. Hence we can write (R; D; a) instead of (R; D; a). Fix a, consider a problem with two agents (R; fD i g i=1;2 ), and set
Assume q 2 1 (a is critical). We choose a set X labeled X = f1; 2; g of proxy items, disjoint from R and with cardinality p 1 + p 2 . We add item 1 in X to the rst serving set in D 1 (a), and nowhere else: this addition satis es the premises of IAN thus it respects the shares of item a. Next we add item 2 in X to the second serving set in D 1 (a), and nowhere else: again the the shares of item a do not change. We continue adding one di erent proxy item to exactly one minimal serving set of a single agent, starting with the serving sets in D 1 (a) and continuing with those in for some function f . Fixing p 2 = q 2 = 1 (i.e., all items are indispensable to agent 2), we get (R; D 1 ; a) = h(jRj) f (p 1 ; q 1 ). We can clearly drop the term h(jRj) that plays no role in the proportional form (2), so the proof of step 3 is complete.
Step 4. Replication implies ' = ' for some 0. Steps 2 and 3 imply the following form for our index:
for all problems of all sizes. Property i) in De nition 2 says that ' i (N; R; fD i g i2N ; a) is largest w.r.t.
This amounts to g(p; p) g(p 0 ; q 0 ) whenever these cardinalities are jointly feasible for some R. If jRj = r then all (p; p) s.t. p t 1 are feasible; as R can be arbitrarily large, we conclude g(p; p) = g(p 0 ; p 0 ) for all p; p 
for any p i ; q i , with q 2 1. Taking p 2 = q 2 = 1 gives g(Kp 1 ; q 1 ) = g(K; 1)g(p 1 ; q 1 ), and renaming variables we have g(pp 0 ; q) = g(p 0 ; 1)g(p; q) for all 1 q p and 1 p 0
Exchanging the role of p; p 0 gives
for a function f , such that f (0) = 0 and f (q) > 0 for q 1. From g(p; p) = 1, we get g(p; q) =
f (p) . Plugging this in equation (13) gives f (pp
for all p; p 0 1, so after one more innocuous normalization f (1) = 1, we conclude that f is multiplicative:
Moreover g(p; q) 1 implies that f is weakly increasing.
It remains to prove that f is a power function with non negative exponent. Fix two integers p; q 1. For any x; y; x 0 ; y 0 2 N the monotonicity and multiplicative character of f imply
i.e., in log form
As x; y; x 0 ; y 0 are arbitrary, this implies that the vectors (ln p; ln q) and (ln f (p); ln f (q)) are collinear. Taking q = 1 we get ln f (p) > 0 for p 2; taking p; q 2 we see that
is constant for p 2, thus there is a constant such that ln f (p) = ln p for all p, including p = 1 because f (1) = 1. The monotonicity of f implies 0, hence g(p; q) takes the desired form g(p; q) = ( q p ) , and the proof of step 4 is complete.
The additive cost allocation rule derived from the index ' is
For = 0, the rule 0 divides the cost of item a equally among all agents for whom a is critical, or equally among all agents if a is critical for nobody. This is where our convention (0) 0 = 0 plays a role. For = 1 the individual usage index 1 is the canonical counting index (5); we call the corresponding rule the counting rule:
The Theorem implies a characterization of the family of rules (14) by means of the same ve axioms (suitably reformulated in terms of cost allocation rules), plus cost additivity. We omit the details.
More interesting is the fact that if 2 [0; 1], and only then, the cost allocation rule satis es a natural lower bound on cost shares. In a problem (N; R; fD j g j2N ; c) the Stand Alone cost of agent i is: sa(D i ; c) = min S2D i c S . The unanimity cost share is 1 n sa(D i ; c): before we know anything about the other agents' characteristics, we can hold agent i responsible for at least her fair share of her stand alone cost: Unanimity Lower bound: for all problems (N; R; fD j g j2N ; c) and all i: 
Fix a problem (N; R; fD j g j2N ; c) and apply this to
from which the desired conclusion follows because c S sa(D i ; c) for each S 2
Only if statement. Fix > 1. Pick an arbitrary set of items R, and an agent i with service constraints D i = (fag; a 2 R), so 
and this inequality holds for n large enough because x x > 0.
Note that the rule in proportional form (2) satis es the Unanimity Lower Bound as well when the index is the probabilistic index (6) .
We conclude the section by checking the independence of the axioms in our Theorem.
1) Drop Anonymity: x a mapping N 3 i ! i > 0; then the proportional usage index (2) 
meets all other axioms. 4) Drop Irrelevance of Additional Needs: then the proportional usage index (2) derived from the probabilistic index (6) meets all other axioms. 5) Drop Replication: choose an increasing homeomorphism h from [0; 1] into itself that is not a power function; then the proportional usage index (2) with individual index
meets all other axioms.
Examples
We present a series of examples displaying both good and bad features of our canonical counting method (15), in particular by comparing it to the probabilistic index. It is a solution to a very general class of problems so it is not surprising that in some speci c situations the method produces questionable results.
Set cover
This is the case where for every agent, each minimal serving set is a singleton. So an item a is a non empty subset of N , and providing a meets the needs of all its members. The set R is a subset of 2 N ?. The classic set cover problem (see e.g., Wolsey, 1998) looks for a cheapest set of items covering N . In our model we set T i = fa 2 Rji 2 ag and we have
and the cost of a is divided among all agents i of a in proportion to 1 jT i j . The probabilistic usage index p coincides with 1 for the set cover problems.
Homogenous items
Example 1: identical items. Write R(p) for the set of subsets of R with p elements. We assume that all items are identical, and agent i needs at least p i items to be provided. Thus
The counting method 1 de ned in (15) divides costs in proportion to the parameters p i , a plausible recommendation which coincides, again, with that of the probabilistic usage index. ! for blue items: Ann $7:6, Bob $2:4 ! for red items: Ann $5:3, Bob $4:7 Note that the total bill of the two agents in the two rules are fairly close though.
Network connections
Example 1: several sources on a tree or a loop. The tree in the gure below represents a network where the three leaf nodes !; ! 0 ; !"; are \sources", while agents live on the other nodes. Each agent is served by a connection to any source node, and the costly items are the edges of the graph. It is easy to generalize these examples to an arbitrary tree with an arbitrary number of sources on the leafs of the tree. The graph below contains a single loop and three leaf-sources !; ! 0 ; !", as before. Our counting index can easily handle problems where some agents require 1-connectivity to some source, while others need 2-connectivity: two edge disjoint paths from the agent to some sources. For agent 1 located at v 1 and seeking 1-connectivity, we have six minimal serving sets, i.e., the following paths
on the loop, = 1 3 outside the loop 4 If is the set of sources, then the index of an edge e is
The case where sources are not necessarily on leafs is almost as simple.
Now if agent 1 needs 2-connectivity, we have The probabilistic index seems more compelling here,
for all other edges.
It is not hard to evaluate the recommendation of the counting rule for any number of nodes and the complete graph of edges, and to show that if Ann wants to connect two nodes X; Y , she pays much less for the edge XY than an agent with disjoint needs. (7) (CSY) it is easy to see that it is transitive as well.
5
Thus orders SC in nitely many indi erence classes SC k : by property i) in De nition 2, the top class containing all D 2 SC for which a is indispensable; by property iii) the bottom class contains all D 2 SC for which a is not critical. The case covered in the theorem corresponds to two indi erence classes, on one hand all D for which a is critical, on the other hand all D for which it is not.
Inside each indi erence class we have n (D; D 1 ; ; D n 1 ) > 0, and if the class contains three or more elements, we nd the proportional form (2) , where the individual index is class-speci c. Given an arbitrary pro le (D i ; i 2 N ) of service constraints, the only agents j with positive shares are those such that D j is in the largest indi erence class represented in (D i ; i 2 N ); and those agents share the cost of a in proportion to the individual indices for that class. 
Network reliability indices:
The indices identi ed in our Theorem capture but one out of many possible approaches to the measurement of costresponsibility for redundant items. The probabilistic index described above is another idea. Yet another, also worthy of further research, uses the classic concept of reliability of a network (Ball, 1979) . Given resources R, and an agent i with service constraints D i , suppose " is the exogenous probability of any item (link) failure, and that failures are stochastically independent. For any T R, let r i (T ; ") be the reliability of R for i, i.e., the probability that she is served when only the items in T are purchased. A natural individual usage index is the marginal reliability of item a:
" (D i ; a) = r i (R; ") r i (R fag; ")
In the same spirit another candidate is the Shapley value of item a in the cooperative game T ! r i (T ; ").
